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Abstract 
In this study we examined the role of mood-congruency and retention interval on the 
false recognition of emotion laden items using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) paradigm. Previous research has shown a mood-congruent false memory 
enhancement during immediate recognition tasks. The present study examined the 
persistence of this effect following a one-week delay. Participants were placed in a 
negative or neutral mood, presented with negative-emotion and neutral-emotion DRM 
word lists, and administered with both immediate and delayed recognition tests. 
Results showed that a negative mood state increased remember judgments for 
negative-emotion critical lures, in comparison to neutral-emotion critical lures, on 
both immediate and delayed testing. These findings are discussed in relation to 
theories of spreading activation and emotion enhanced memory, with consideration of 
the applied forensic implications of such findings. 
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 False memories occur when people recollect events that did not happen or 
incorrectly recollect events that did happen. In legal contexts, the inaccurate 
recollection of events can lead to unsafe convictions. Of the first 250 individuals in 
the United States to have their convictions overturned as a result of DNA evidence, 
76% were convicted, at least in part, as a result of eyewitness error (Innocence 
Project, 2010). It is therefore important to establish the conditions under which false 
remembering can occur. When people are exposed to a crime, either as a witness or a 
victim, they often experience a negative event that has the potential to induce negative 
affect. Furthermore, there can then be a potentially indefinite delay between 
experiencing this negative event and recalling it during a legal trial (Neubauer & 
Fradella, 2011). The current study is the first to examine whether negative affect 
whilst encoding negatively valenced information can impact upon false remembering 
when recollection occurs both immediately and after a delay. 
A popular method of studying false remembering in the laboratory is the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). In this paradigm, participants study a list of semantic associates (e.g., cigar, 
cigarette, chimney) that all converge on a single non-studied critical lure (e.g., 
smoke). On subsequent testing, participants often falsely recall and recognize these 
critical lures as frequently as studied items. Moreover, when participants are asked to 
make remember-know judgments to the critical lures (where a remember response 
indicates participants can mentally re-experience the presentation of a studied item 
and a know response indicates participants believe an item is familiar but cannot 
recollect its presentation) they typically make a remember response (e.g., Roediger & 
McDermott). The DRM paradigm can therefore produce vivid false memories. 
Theoretical explanations for DRM lists false memories focus on spreading 
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activation and the associative relations between the studied list items and the critical 
lure (e.g., Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). Spreading activation theories posit that semantically associated words are 
stored in a connectionist network. Activation can spread through this network from 
studied words to related non-studied words. As DRM lists are composed of 
semantically related words that are associates of a non-studied critical lure, the critical 
lure is repeatedly activated during encoding. This activation is powerful enough for 
participants to mistakenly believe the critical lure was generated externally (from the 
study list) rather than internally (from spreading activation). 
The impact of emotion on false remembering has only recently been 
considered. For example, Storbeck and Clore (2005, 2011) examined the impact of 
negative affect on false remembering. They induced negative moods in participants 
and compared their DRM test performance to a control group who received no mood 
induction. Both studies found that negative affect reduced false remembering, with 
the latter showing this only occurred when a negative mood was induced prior to 
encoding. The explanation for this effect focused on the impact of emotion on 
encoding, whereby a negative mood promotes item-specific processing over relational 
processing (see Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). As false remembering in the DRM 
paradigm arises from relational processing, negative moods reduce the likelihood of 
the critical lures being activated during encoding and subsequently falsely 
remembered. 
The impact of valenced DRM word lists on false remembering has also been 
examined. For example, Budson et al. (2006) developed emotional DRM lists (e.g., 
risk, harm, threat) that are associated with negative-emotion critical lures (e.g., 
danger). They found that false recognition rates for negative-emotion critical lures 
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were higher than for neutral critical lures (see also, Brainerd et al., 2010; Howe, 
Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010). One possible explanation for this effect 
is that emotional word lists are high in semantic density, as emotion enhances the 
association between list items (see Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007, 
and Howe et al.). Although not directly assessed in the false memory literature, it can 
be speculated that emotional DRM lists are more likely to activate critical lures due to 
this enhanced semantic association. 
Negative affect and negative-emotion DRM lists have been used by Ruci, 
Tomes, & Zelenski (2009) to determine whether there is a mood-congruency effect on 
false remembering. In their study, participants were assigned to one of three mood-
induction conditions (positive, negative and control) and presented with positive, 
negative, and neutral DRM word lists. A mood-congruency effect was observed, 
whereby participants in the mood induction conditions were more likely to falsely 
recognize critical lures that matched their mood state. Moreover, they were more 
likely to make remember  judgments to these items. Ruci et al. suggest this effect can 
be understood by considering the similarities between spreading activation theory and 
Bower’s (1981) Network Theory of Affect. Bower argued that our semantic network 
contains six emotion nodes where moods are represented. When a mood state is 
induced, activation spreads throughout the semantic network towards information that 
is being encoded at that time. Mood-congruent information receives superior 
processing at both encoding and retrieval, creating a mood-congruent memory 
enhancement. Mood states therefore provide an additional source of activation for 
valenced critical lures when emotional DRM lists are studied, increasing the 
likelihood that they will be falsely remembered at test. 
Several studies have also shown that false memories persist over time. In 
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standard DRM studies, with neutral lists, false memory rates remain constant after 
retention intervals of more than two days, while veridical memory rates decline (e.g., 
McDermott, 1996; Seamon et al., 2002). In studies of veridical memory, it has also 
been found that emotional material is better remembered than neutral material when 
testing occurs after delays of more than one hour (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). Building 
upon these findings, Howe et al. (2010) examined whether false memories deriving 
from negative DRM lists, in comparison to neutral DRM lists, would exhibit 
persistence when memory was tested both immediately and after a one-week delay. 
They found that negative false memory rates increased after one-week whereas 
neutral false memory rates remained unchanged. Howe et al. suggest emotional words 
lists are semantically denser than neutral word lists, meaning critical lures are more 
likely to be activated. Additionally, over time, negative DRM lists may give rise to 
higher rates of false recognition because consolidation of emotional material is a more 
protracted process (e.g., Sharot et al., 2007). The exact mechanism by which this 
persistence occurs is still to be determined. 
The current study aimed to extend the findings of Ruci et al. (2009) by 
examining whether the mood-congruent false memory enhancement they observed on 
an immediate recognition test, when participants studied negative and neutral-emotion 
DRM lists, persists after a one-week delay. This study will also use the remember-
know procedure to examine differences in phenomenological experience of 
recognizing negative and neutral-emotion critical lures before and after a delay. Ruci 
et al. found that negative critical lures were remembered more often than neutral 
critical lures in the mood-congruent condition, but also raised concerns that a prior 
recall test in their study may have inflated the number of remember responses they 
observed. The present study will therefore provide a more definitive test of this effect. 
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In line with Bower’s (1981) Network Theory of Affect, which would predict that 
mood-congruent critical lures receive heightened activation at encoding, and 
consistent with Howe et al.’s (2010) demonstration that false recognition of negative 
critical lures can increase after one-week, it is anticipated a negative mood-congruent 
false memory enhancement will be observed on both immediate and delayed testing 
and that this enhancement will be driven by a higher number of remember judgments 
towards the mood-congruent critical lures. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate students (12 males and 36 females) aged 18-36 (M 
= 21.04, SD =  4.96) participated for course credit. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure  
 Participants were randomly assigned to either a negative (n =  24) or neutral (n 
= 24) mood condition. Mood was induced using two five-minute video clips. The 
negative mood was induced by showing participants the final scene of the movie 
Dancer in the Dark, where the main protagonist is hung in prison for committing a 
murder. The neutral mood was induced by showing participants a scene from a 
wildlife documentary. As this study focuses on the influence of mood at encoding, all 
participants were presented with a final neutral film clip (another wildlife 
documentary) before the immediate recognition test to revert their mood to a neutral 
state. The participants’ mood throughout the study was assessed using the valence 
rating taken from the Self-Assessment Manikin scale (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). 
The SAM is a 9-point Likert scale that assesses a person’s affective state. Low values 
represent a negative mood, whereas high values represent a positive mood. Mood 
measures were taken before and after the initial film clip to ensure successful mood 
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induction and then again immediately before each recognition test to ensure all 
participants were in a neutral mood prior to having their memory tested.  
 There were 12 DRM lists, 6 neutral and 6 negative-emotion. The neutral lists 
were taken from Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) and each consisted of 12 
words associated with the following critical lures: sleep, chair, car, smoke, needle, 
smell. The negative-emotion lists were taken from Dewhurst et al. (2012). Each list 
consisted of 12 negatively valenced associates to the following critical lures: anger, 
cry, fear, hate, alone, lie. Mean valence and arousal ratings for list items and critical 
lures were taken from Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 
1999). Independent samples t-tests showed that negative list items and critical lures 
had lower ratings of valence than neutral list items (p <  .05 for both), and higher 
levels of arousal (p <  .05 for both). 
 The 12 lists were recorded for auditory presentation, with a 3-second interval 
between each item. Half of the participants studied the lists in the order shown above 
with negative and neutral lists alternating, and half were presented in the reverse 
order. Participants were asked to listen carefully to the lists, as they would receive 
two recognition tests: the first taking place immediately and the second one-week 
later. After the presentation of all 12 lists, participants were asked to complete the 
SAM and were provided with instructions to complete the recognition test. As time of 
test was a within-subjects factor, two recognition tests were created from the 12 DRM 
lists. Half of the lists and the associated critical lures were used to produce the first 
recognition test, and half were used to produce the second recognition test. The 
immediate 48-item recognition test consisted of 6 critical lures (3 negative and 3 
neutral), 24 targets (2 items from 6 neutral lists and 6 negative lists), and 18 unrelated 
and non-studied fillers (9 neutral words and 9 negative words). The delayed 48-item 
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recognition test was constructed in the same fashion, but contained critical lures, 
target words from the remaining studied lists, and a further 18 unrelated fillers. Use of 
these recognition tests at each time of test was counterbalanced. Test items were 
presented in a random order on a response sheet, with the labels old/new and 
remember/know/guess next to each item. If participants circled old, they were asked 
to make an additional remember/know/guess judgment. Instructions for these 
responses were modeled after those of Rajaram (1993) but with the addition of a 
guess response to remove the element of guessing typically associated with a know 
response.  
Results  
Mood-manipulation check 
Two participants in the negative mood group were removed from the analysis 
because their valence scores increased after the negative mood induction. There was 
no difference in valence scores of the participants in the negative and neutral mood 
groups before mood induction (M = 6.42 vs. M = 6.68), t(44) = .77, p = .45, d = .23, 
but the negative mood group scored lower in valence than the neutral mood group 
after mood induction (M = 3.55 vs. M = 6.63), t(44) = -9.68, p < .001, d =  2.92. The 
valence scores for negative and neutral mood groups did not differ before the 
immediate recognition test, (M = 6.27 vs. M = 6.00), t(44) = .85, p =.40, d = .26, or 
the delayed recognition test (M = 6.36 vs. M = 6.41), t(44) = -.19, p =.85, d = .05, 
confirming the two groups moods only differed prior to encoding.  
Recognition test analyses  
Recognition test responses (old, remember, know, and guess judgments to 
critical lures, list items, and unrelated fillers) were analyzed separately using 2 (mood: 
neutral vs. negative) x 2 (stimuli: neutral vs. negative) x 2 (time of test: immediate vs. 
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one-week) ANOVA’s with repeated measures on all but the first factor. Significant 
interactions were explored using Bonferroni pairwise-comparisons (alpha set at .05). 
Mean proportions and standard errors for the dependent measures are reported in 
Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
False recognition of critical lures 
For old responses, there were significant main effects of stimuli, F(1, 44) = 
5.45, p = .02, ηp2 = .11, and time, F(1, 44) = 5.97, p = .02, ηp2 = .12, but not mood, 
F(1, 44) = 1.55, p = .22, ηp2 = .03. These main effects were qualified by a stimuli x 
time interaction, F(1,44) = 13.16 , p = .001, ηp2 = .23. Pairwise-comparisons revealed 
no difference in false recognition rates for negative lures (M =  .74) and neutral lures 
(M =  .78) on immediate testing (p = .34), but false recognition was higher for negative 
lures (M =  .78) compared to neutral lures (M =  .55) after a one-week delay.  
For false remember judgments, there was a significant main effect of time, 
F(1, 44) = 7.81, p =  .008, ηp2 = .15. Although there were no significant effects of 
mood or stimuli (both F’s <  1, ns), there was a significant mood x stimuli interaction, 
F(1, 44) = 7.81, p =  .01, ηp2 = .14, revealing a mood-congruency effect. Pairwise-
comparisons revealed that false remember judgments were higher for negative lures in 
the negative mood group, compared to the neutral mood group, but there was no 
difference in false remember judgments for neutral lures between the two mood 
groups (p =  .48). Figure 1 highlights this interaction for immediate and delayed 
recognition. A stimuli x time of test interaction was found for false remember 
judgments, F(1, 44 ) = 6.59, p =  .01, ηp2 = .13. Pairwise-comparisons showed that 
false recognition was marginally higher for negative lures (M =  .33) compared to 
neutral lures (M = .22) after a one-week delay (p = .06). However, the significant 
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interaction derived from each stimuli type at time of test. There was no reduction in 
false remember judgments for negative lures over the one-week interval (M =  .34 vs. 
M = .33, p =  .89), but false remember judgments for neutral lures went down (M =  
.41 vs. M =  .22). 
For know judgments, although there were no significant main effects for time, 
mood condition (both, F <  1, ns), or stimuli, F(1, 44) = 3.36, p = .07, ηp2 = .07, there 
was a significant stimuli x time of test interaction, F(1, 44) = 6.39, p = .02, ηp2 = .13. 
There was no difference in false recognition rates for negative and neutral lures on 
immediate testing (M =  .26 vs. M =  .29, p = .57), but false recognition was higher for 
negative lures (M =  .36) compared to neutral lures (M =  .20) after a one-week delay. 
Guess judgments were low, and analysis revealed no significant main effects (all F’s 
<  1, ns). There was a significant mood x time of test interaction, F(1, 44 ) = 4.50, p =  
.04, ηp2 = .09, but no pairwise-comparisons were significant (all p’s > .05).  
In sum, false recognition was higher for negative lures compared to neutral 
lures after a one-week delay. Moreover, a mood-congruency effect was observed for 
remember judgments towards critical lures at both time intervals. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Correct recognition 
For old responses, there was no significant main effect of mood, F(1, 44) = 
2.15, p =  .15, ηp2 = .05. There were significant main effects of time, F(1, 44) = 96.79, 
p <  .001, ηp2 = .69, and stimuli, F(1, 44) = 20.22, p <  .001, ηp2 = .32, and a significant 
stimuli x time interaction, F(1, 44) = 13.01, p <  .001, ηp2 = .23. Pairwise-comparisons 
showed no significant difference between neutral (M = .79) and negative-emotion 
stimuli (M = .78, p =  .65) on the immediate test, but correct recognition was higher 
for negative (M = .64) compared to neutral (M = .47) stimuli on the delayed test.  
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For correct remember judgments there were no main effects of mood or 
stimuli (both F’s < 1, ns). There was a main effect of time, F(1, 44) = 93.51, p <  .001, 
ηp2 = .68, and a significant stimuli x time interaction, F(1, 44) = 12.93, p <  .001, ηp2 = 
.22. Correct remember judgments decreased across the one-week delay, however on 
immediate testing remember judgments were higher for neutral stimuli (M =  .52 vs. 
M = .41) and, after a one-week delay, higher for negative stimuli (M =  .26 vs. M = 
.17).  
For the analysis of know judgments, correct recognition was higher for 
negative compared to neutral stimuli, F(1, 44) = 14.61, p <  .001, ηp2 = .25. Guess 
judgments were low, but increased over time, F(1, 44) = 10.96, p = .002, ηp2 = .20. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant (all F’s < 1, ns).  
In sum, correct recognition was generally higher for negative items compared 
to neutral items after a delay. No mood-congruency effects were observed. 
False recognition of unrelated fillers 
False recognition rates for unrelated fillers were low. For overall recognition, 
there were main effects of time, F(1, 44) = 22.37, p <  .001, ηp2 =, .34, and stimuli, 
F(1, 44) = 21.28, p <  .001, ηp2 =, .33, with higher false recognition of unrelated fillers 
over time and for negative compared to neutral stimuli, but no significant interactions 
(all F’s < 1, ns). False remember, F(1, 44) = 4.40, p =  .04, ηp2 = 09, and know 
judgments, F(1, 44) = 7.60, p =  .008, ηp2 = .15, were higher for negative compared to 
neutral stimuli. False guess judgments were also higher for negative compared to 
neutral stimuli, F(1, 44) = 7.72, p =  .008, ηp2 = .15 and increased over a delay, F(1, 
44) = 16.47, p <  .001, ηp2 = .27, but there were no further significant main effects or 
interactions for this analysis (all F’s < 1, ns). The higher false alarm rate for negative 
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unrelated filler items could support previous research suggesting that negative valence 
leads to a more liberal response bias (Howe et al., 2010). 
Discussion 
The present study demonstrated a mood-congruent false memory enhancement 
whereby participants who were in a negative mood at encoding were more likely to 
assign remember judgments (indicative of a rich recollective experience) to negative-
emotion critical lures than neutral-emotion critical lures. This effect was observed 
regardless of whether testing occurred immediately or after a one-week delay. This is 
the first demonstration that a mood-congruent false memory enhancement can persist 
over time. 
The mood-congruent false memory enhancement for remember judgments 
observed after immediate testing replicates the findings of Ruci et al. (2009). This 
pattern of results is consistent with spreading activation models of false remembering 
(Howe et al., 2009; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and Bower’s (1981) Network 
Theory of Affect. According to spreading activation theories, when lists of semantic 
associates are studied at encoding, semantically related non-studied items are 
automatically activated. In the present study, the list items all converged on a single 
sematic associate (the critical lure) and this repeated activation results in participants 
mistakenly believing they have studied the critical lure. Bower’s (1981) Network 
Theory of Affect suggests mood states can further activate mood-congruent critical 
lures through excitation of emotion nodes in the semantic network. This additional 
source of activation increases the likelihood of mood-congruent critical lures being 
falsely remembered. Ruci et al. had concerns that a recall test prior to their 
recognition test may have artificially inflated the number of remember responses 
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observed in their study. As the current study replicated this effect using only a 
recognition test, this suggests their concerns were unfounded.  
The observed persistence of the mood-congruent false memory effect for 
remember judgments builds upon previous research demonstrating that negatively-
valenced false memories also persist over time (Howe et al., 2010). Although not 
tested in this study, the findings are consistent with recent evidence suggesting that 
emotionally arousing experiences cause the release of adrenal stress hormones that 
increase norepinephrine in the amygdala. Here, amygdala activity during encoding of 
negative-emotion material modulates memory consolidation and thus influences long-
term memory (see McGaugh, 2005). The persistence of the mood-congruent false 
memory effect could be a result of enhanced associative activation and binding of 
emotional context at encoding (see Talmi et al., 2007) and long term consolidation 
processes selective to the encoding of negative-emotion material (e.g., Sharot et al., 
2007). The finding that this occurs for false memories is likely due to the 
consolidatory nature of long-term retention. Payne et al. (2009) argued that a long 
delay does more than just consolidate veridical memories, it restructures them to 
allow for insights and inferences to be drawn and allows integration into preexisting 
memory structures. They concluded that susceptibility to false memories might be the 
price we pay for such flexible use of our memories. 
The current study has applied implications with regards the formation of false 
memories in forensic settings. For example, an eyewitness to a violent robbery will be 
exposed to a negative event that may induce negative emotional arousal. The 
eyewitness may be asked to provide a statement regarding the robbery to the police in 
the immediate aftermath of its occurrence in order to facilitate arrests. The mood-
congruency between the eyewitness’ affective state at the time of the robbery and the 
Mood and False Memories 
15 
 
nature of the robbery itself could enhance the likelihood of vivid false memories 
being incorporated into this statement. The eyewitness may also be asked to provide a 
testimony in court, but there is a potentially indefinite delay between the crime taking 
place and this testimony occurring as arrests need to be made and trials in the US 
typically only commence between 90 and 120 days after arrests (Neubauer & 
Fradella, 2011). The findings from the current study suggest that any false memories 
generated in the original police statement could persist and also be made at trial. 
Caution is needed when generalizing laboratory based findings to real world 
events. A possible shortcoming of the present experiment is that it used recognition 
tests, rather than free recall, which is potentially less representative of real-life 
recollection of autobiographical events. However, Howe et al. (2010) argued that 
autobiographical recollection could be cued when looking at photographs of an event, 
talking to others about a past event, or indeed, answering specific yes/no questions 
about the event, thus adding legitimacy to the use of recognition tests here.  
 A further potential shortcoming is that the present experiment used word lists 
to induce false remembering. The experience of studying word lists is clearly different 
from experiencing a life event. Moreover, the induced mood states in this study could 
be less intense than those evoked in real life situations. However, Wade et al. (2007) 
argued that any changes observed in memory should be representative of a general 
model of memory construction, regardless of the conditions under which these 
changes occur. Indeed the results from the current study can be compared to those of 
Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach (2008), who found it easier to elicit false 
autobiographical memories in relation to negative events than neutral events. As 
Howe et al. (2010) concluded, although the procedures used to investigate false 
autobiographical memories differ from those used in the DRM paradigm, the results 
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are often similar. There is, therefore, reason to speculate that the mechanisms 
responsible for the construction of DRM list false memories are also responsible for 
the development of false memories outside the laboratory. 
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Table 1. Proportions of false and correct recognition as a function of mood state, list valence, and retention interval 
 Immediate Recognition Test Delayed Recognition Test 
 Negative Mood Neutral Mood Negative Mood             Neutral Mood 
                       List Valence Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral 
Item Type         
Critical Lures         
Old responses .76 (.05) .80 (.07) .72 (.06) .67 (.06) .89 (.03) .55 (.08) .67 (.07) .56 (.06) 
Remember .41 (.06) .39 (.06) .26 (.06) .43 (.05) .40 (.07) .20 (.06) .25 (.07) .25 (.05) 
Know .27 (.05) .33 (.05) .25 (.06) .25 (.05) .36 (.07) .20 (.05) .35 (.06) .19 (.04) 
Guess .08 (.04) .08 (.04) .20 (.04) .08 (.03) .12 (.04) .15 (.05) .07 (.03) .11 (.04) 
List Items          
Old responses .81 (.03) .78 (.03) .77 (.04) .77 (.03) .67 (.04) .52 (.05) .61 (.04) .42 (.04) 
Remember .38 (.04) .49 (.05) .43 (.04) .55 (.04) .25 (.04) .18 (.05) .26 (.04) .17 (.03) 
Know .29 (.04) .19 (.04) .24 (.03) .14 (.02) .21 (.04) .18 (.04) .22 (.03) .14 (.02) 
Guess .14 (.02) .22 (.04) .10 (.02) .09 (.01) .22 (.04) .17 (.04) .13 (.03) .11 (.02) 
Unrelated Fillers         
Old responses .23 (.04) .07 (.02) .22 (.04) .14 (.03) .32 (.05) .19 (.05) .32 (.04) .20 (.04) 
Remember .03 (.01) .01 (.01) .04 (.02) .02 (.01) .05 (.02) .04 (.02) .06 (.02) .02 (.01) 
Know .10 (.02) .04 (.02) .07 (.02) .06 (.03) .11 (.03) .05 (.02) .10 (.02) .07 (.02) 
Guess .10 (.03) .04 (.01) .11 (.02) .06 (.02) .16 (.03) .10 (.03) .16 (.03) .11 (.03) 
Note: SE in parentheses  
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Figure 1. Proportions of false remember responses as a function of mood states and list valence. 
Note: Error bars represent SE. 
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